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Distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) was introduced by Naor and Pinkas (2000) [31], and
then generalized to (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
by Blundo et al. (2007) [8] and Nikov et al. (2002) [34].
In the generalized setting, a (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
allows a sender to communicate one of n
secrets to a receiver with the help of  servers. Speciﬁcally, the transfer task of the sender
is distributed among  servers and the receiver interacts with k out of the  servers
in order to retrieve the secret he is interested in. The DOT protocols we consider in
this work are information-theoretically secure. The known (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols require
linear (in n) communication complexity between the receiver and servers. In this paper,
we construct (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols which only require sublinear (in n) communication
complexity between the receiver and servers. Our constructions are based on information-
theoretic private information retrieval. In particular, we obtain both a speciﬁc reduction from
(k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic private information
retrieval and a general reduction from (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to any information-theoretic private
information retrieval. The speciﬁc reduction yields (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols of
communication complexity O (n1/(k−τ−1)/t) between a semi-honest receiver and servers
for any integers t and τ such that 1 t k−1 and 0 τ  k−1−t. The general reduction
yields (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols which are as communication-eﬃcient as the
underlying private information retrieval protocols for any integers t and τ such that
1 t k − 2 and 0 τ  k − 1− t.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In an oblivious transfer protocol a sender sends information to a receiver such that the sender is oblivious to the informa-
tion it sends. Speciﬁcally, in a one-out-of-n oblivious transfer, denoted by
(n
1
)
-OT, the sender has n secrets W1, . . . ,Wn , the
receiver has an index i ∈ [n], and the sender communicates Wi to the receiver such that the receiver learns no information
about the remaining secrets and the sender knows nothing about i. The notion of oblivious transfer was introduced by
Rabin [36] and then redeﬁned in the form of
(2
1
)
-OT by Even et al. [19] and
(n
1
)
-OT by Brassard et al. [10], respectively. The(2
1
)
-OT,
(n
1
)
-OT and Rabin’s OT have been shown equivalent to each other [9,17]. As an important cryptographic primitive,
oblivious transfer has found fundamental applications in cryptographic studies and protocol design [23,24,30,11,15,25].
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Oblivious transfer has been implemented under a variety of assumptions [36,19,7,32,1,22,26,29]. However, these imple-
mentations are computationally secure and involve heavy public-key operations. Naor and Pinkas [31] introduced distributed
oblivious transfers (DOT) which are information-theoretically secure and computationally eﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, their (k, )-
DOT-
(2
1
)
protocols [31] are based on polynomial interpolation and only involve arithmetic operations over ﬁnite ﬁelds.
Subsequently, the (k, )-DOT-
(2
1
)
was generalized to (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
for any positive integer n by Blundo et al. [8] and Nikov
et al. [34]. Informally, a (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
(see Fig. 1) involves a sender D who has n secrets W1, . . . ,Wn , a receiver U who
has an index i ∈ [n], and  servers S1, . . . ,S . It consists of a setup stage when the sender D distributes the secrets among
the  servers by sending to each server Sh a message, and an oblivious transfer stage when the receiver U contacts k out
of the  servers to compute the secret Wi . It is required that D learns no information on i and U learns no more in-
formation except Wi . More precisely, a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol should satisfy: (I) after the oblivious transfer
stage, any coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i; (II) before the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver
learns no information on the sender’s secrets, even if it colludes with up to τ servers; (III) after the oblivious trans-
fer stage, a malicious receiver is able to obtain at most one of the n secrets, even if it colludes with up to τ malicious
servers.
Distributed oblivious transfers have important applications in the privacy preserving architecture of Naor et al. [33]. The
architecture involves an auction issuer, several auctioneers and numerous bidders. Typically, in privacy preserving auctions, the
auctioneers publish the details of the auctions they are organizing, receive both encrypted bids from the bidders and garbled
programs from the auction issuer, and then compute and publish the auctions. The privacy of the bidders is preserved as
long as the auction issuer and auctioneers do not collude. Let the auction issuer play the roles of sender and servers and the
auctioneer play the role of receiver in the DOT model. Then any DOT protocol provides a solution for the privacy preserving
auction problem. The known (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols require the receiver to communicate Ω(n) bits with the contacted
servers for retrieving one secret. The communication cost is unaffordable whenever n is large. Therefore, for a DOT-based
privacy preserving auction, the auctioneers necessarily communicate a large number of bits with the auction issuer in order
to compute and publish an auction. In the described scenario, communication-eﬃcient DOT protocols, in which the receiver
and servers exchange a much smaller number of bits, are preferred.
In this work, we construct communication-eﬃcient DOT protocols. We propose both a speciﬁc reduction from
communication-eﬃcient (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic private information retrieval
(PIR) [14,5,38] and a general reduction from communication-eﬃcient (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to any information-theoretic PIR. The
speciﬁc reduction yields DOT protocols of sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and servers. The gen-
eral reduction yields extremely communication-eﬃcient DOT protocols due to the recent progress in the research of PIR and
locally decodable codes (LDCs) [39,18].
1.1. Related work
Private information retrieval (PIR). A t-private k-server information-theoretic private information retrieval protocol [14]
allows a user U to retrieve a data item Wi from k servers S1, . . . ,Sk , each of which has a copy of the database
W = W1, . . . ,Wn , such that any coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i. The eﬃciency of a PIR protocol
is measured by its communication complexity, i.e., the total number of bits exchanged between the user and servers. Chor
et al. [14] proved that in a single-server information-theoretic PIR protocol, the user has to exchange Ω(n) bits for retrieving
one data item. On the other hand, if there are k  2 non-communicating servers, then the communication complexity can
be as small as O (n1/k). There are numerous constructions [14,2,6,5,38,39,18,28,12] of PIR protocols. The most eﬃcient 1-
private 2-server and 3-server PIR protocols are of communication complexity O (n1/3) [14] and exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) [18],
respectively. For k > t > 1, the t-private PIR protocols [5,38] are of communication complexity O (n1/(2k−1)/t). To compare
with (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
, one may think that there is a dummy sender D who distributes the database W to servers in any k-
server PIR protocol (see Fig. 1). In this comparative PIR model, the secrets of D are completely disclosed to the servers and,
furthermore, the user is not prevented from obtaining more information than what he is interested in (e.g., an execution of
the 2-server PIR protocol of [14] reveals O (n1/3) secrets to U ).
Symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR). In a t-private k-server symmetrically private information retrieval [21],
a user U is allowed to retrieve a data item Wi from k-servers S1, . . . ,Sk , each of which has a copy of the database W ,
such that any coalition of up to t-servers learns no information on i and U learns no more information except Wi . Gertner
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(i.e., all servers share a common random string X ). In particular, their reductions preserve the asymptotic communication
complexity of the underlying PIR protocols and require the use of a small number of additional auxiliary servers. One may
think that there is a dummy sender D who distributes W and X to all servers in an SPIR protocol (see Fig. 1). In this
comparative SPIR model, the secrets of D are completely disclosed to the servers. Therefore, SPIR does not provide solutions
for DOT.
Random server model for private information retrieval (RPIR). In the PIR and SPIR models, the database W is replicated among
multiple non-communicating servers. This data replication problem may be serious because each server could be broken
into or sell the database behind the legitimate database owner’s back. Gertner et al. [20] suggested that the database owner
secret-shares W among random servers instead of simply replicating W among non-communicating servers. A PIR protocol
in this random server model consists of a setup stage when the database owner D shares W among the random severs and
an on-line stage when the user U retrieves a data item Wi by interacting with the random servers (see Fig. 1). Gertner et al.
[20] proposed a general reduction from RPIR to PIR. Speciﬁcally, in order to preserve the asymptotic communication com-
plexity of the underlying PIR protocols, their reduction requires a large number of random servers. As most PIR protocols,
the RPIR protocols cannot prevent a user from obtaining more information than what he is interested in.
Locally random reduction (LRR). A (t,k)-locally random reduction [4] allows a user to evaluate a function f at a private input
i with the help of k servers, each of which has a reduced form of the function f , such that any coalition of up to t servers
learns no information on i. As PIR and RPIR, LRR cannot prevent the user from learning more information on f than f (i).
Commodity-based private information retrieval (cbPIR). A commodity-based private information retrieval [16] involves a user
who wants to retrieve Wi of a database W , a number of database servers which have W and commodity severs which
send off-line messages (called commodities). A cbPIR consists of an off-line commodity stage when the commodity servers
send commodities to the user and database servers and an on-line retrieval stage when the user retrieves Wi by interacting
with the database servers. Although the commodity servers do not have any information on the database, the messages
they send in the off-line commodity stage dramatically reduce the overall communication involving the user in the on-line
retrieval stage. As PIR, RPIR and LRR, a cbPIR cannot prevent the user from obtaining more information on W than what he
is interested in.
Private information storage (PIS). A private information storage [35] allows users to privately read and write into a database
W which is shared among a number of non-communicating servers such that each individual server learns absolutely no
information on which location the users are reading or writing, and what the users are writing into the database. Ostrovsky
et al. [35] built their PIS schemes on information-theoretic PIR. Speciﬁcally, they proposed a reduction from PIS to PIR which
requires only one additional server and a polylogarithmic overhead in communication. As the previous models, PIS does not
provide any privacy against malicious users.
Other models. Rivest [37] considered oblivious transfers in the trusted initializer model. A
(n
1
)
-OT in this model involves a
sender who has n secrets, a receiver who wants to learn one of the n secrets and a trusted initializer. It consists of a setup
stage when the trusted initializer sends private information to the sender and receiver, and a request–reply stage when the
receiver learns one secret by interacting with the sender. OT in this model is different from DOT because all secrets are
completely disclosed to the sender (playing the role of servers in DOT model) who participates in the on-line request–reply
stage and obliviously communicates one secret to the receiver.
1.2. Our results
In this work, we propose both a speciﬁc reduction from (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based information-
theoretic PIR and a general reduction from (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to any information-theoretic PIR.
Speciﬁc reduction from (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based PIR. We obtain a non-black-box construction of (t, τ )-
private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
from any polynomial interpolation-based t-private (k − τ )-server PIR for semi-honest receivers. The
DOT protocols we obtain have sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and servers. Speciﬁcally, we have
that (due to Theorem 1):
– For any integers t , τ , k,  such that 1  t  k − 1, 0  τ  k − 1 − t , and t + τ + 1  k  , there is a (t, τ )-private
(k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication complexity O (n1/(k−1−τ )/t) between a semi-honest receiver and servers.
Our speciﬁc reduction yields (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
for a wide range of values of t , τ , k and . It shows a tradeoff
between the receiver–server communication complexity and privacy.
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(n
1
)
to PIR. We obtain a black-box construction of (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
from any
information-theoretic t-private (k − t − τ )-server PIR. Speciﬁcally, we have that (due to Theorem 3):
– For any integers t , τ , k,  such that k  , 1 t  k − 2, and 0 τ  k − 1− t , if there is a t-private (k − t − τ )-server
PIR protocol of communication complexity γ (n), then there is a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication
complexity O (γ (n)) between the receiver and servers.
Applying the general reduction to the polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols of [5,38], we have that (due to Corol-
lary 1):
– For any integers t , τ , k,  such that 1  t  k − 2, 0  τ  k − 1 − t , and 3t+12 + τ  k  , there is a (t, τ )-private
(k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication complexity O (n1/
2(k−t−τ )−1
t ) between the receiver and servers.
The general reduction allows us to obtain DOT protocols of extremely small receiver–server communication complexity due
to the recent progress in the research of PIR and LDCs. Applying our general reduction to the t-private 3t -server PIR protocols
of communication complexity exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) (which are implied by [3,18]), we have that (due to Corollary 2):
– For any integers t , τ ,  such that  3t +t+τ , there is a (t, τ )-private (3t +t+τ , )-DOT-(n1) protocol of communication
complexity exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) between the receiver and servers.
For small values of t , τ , the above DOT protocols have extremely small communication complexity between the receiver and
servers. For instance, for t = τ = 1 and  5, there is a (1,1)-private (5, )-DOT-(n1) protocol of communication complexity
exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) between the receiver and servers such that: (I) after the oblivious transfer stage, each individual
server learns absolutely no information about which secret the receiver is interested in; (II) before the oblivious transfer
stage, the receiver learns no information about the secrets, even if it colludes with any single server; (III) after the oblivious
transfer stage, a malicious receiver is able to obtain at most one of the secrets, even if it colludes with one malicious
server.
For some settings of the parameters  and k, our reductions are ineﬃcient in terms of setup complexity, i.e., each server
may receive O (
(
−1
k−1
)(k−1
t
)
n+ (k)(kt)) ﬁeld elements in the setup stage. However, this complexity becomes reasonable if  = k
and t is a constant less than k. Note that DOT protocols in a setting where  = k have been considered by Cheong et al. [13].
Our reductions are eﬃcient for that setting.
1.3. Organization
In Section 2, we provide both an informal and a formal deﬁnition of (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
, and develop several
related information equalities; in Section 3, we present our speciﬁc reduction from DOT to polynomial interpolation-
based information-theoretic private information retrieval; in Section 4, we present our general reduction from DOT to
any information-theoretic private information retrieval; in Section 5 we give an evaluation of both reductions; ﬁnally, in
Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we deﬁne (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols and develop related information equalities which ef-
fectively simplify our security proofs. Our deﬁnition follows the vein of [8] and has the strongest requirement for
sender’s privacy which is called sender’s privacy II in our deﬁnition. The (k − 1,0)-private (k, )-DOT-(n1) protocols achiev-
ing sender’s privacy II have been called strongly private in [8] and are necessarily multi-round. However, our construc-
tions in Sections 3 and 4 do yield one-round (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols achieving sender’s privacy II when
(t, τ ) = (k − 1,0).
2.1. Informal description of (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
Let t , τ , k, , and n be nonnegative integers. A one-round (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol P involves:
– a sender D who has n secrets W = W1, . . . ,Wn , which are typically n elements of a ﬁnite ﬁeld F;
– a receiver U who has an index i ∈ [n] and wants to retrieve Wi ;
– additional  servers S1, . . . ,S;
and consists of two stages:
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random input of D;
– an oblivious transfer stage when U interacts with k out of the  servers, say SK = {Sh: h ∈ K } where K ⊆ [] and |K | = k,
sends to each server Sh a query Qh =Q(n, i, K , Y )h and receives the answer Ah = Sh(Dh, Qh), where Y is the random
input of U ,
such that the following requirements are satisﬁed:
– Correctness: The receiver U is able to correctly determine Wi after the oblivious transfer stage;
– Receiver’s privacy: A coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i after the oblivious transfer stage;
– Sender’s privacy I: A coalition of U and up to τ servers learns no information on W before the oblivious transfer stage;
– Sender’s privacy II: Given the transcript of communication with k servers, a coalition of U and up to τ malicious servers
learns at most one secret.
2.2. Formalization of correctness and privacy
Let U¯ and S¯h be the corrupted U and Sh . We deﬁne the related random variables as follows:
– W and I: the sequence of n secrets held by D and the index held by U , respectively;
– X and Y: the random inputs of D and U respectively;
– Dh: the message sent to Sh by D during the setup stage;
– Qh: the query sent to server Sh by U during the oblivious transfer stage;
– Ah: the answer sent to U by server Sh during the oblivious transfer stage;
– Ch: the transcript of communication between U and Sh during the oblivious transfer stage, i.e., Ch = (Qh,Ah);
– Q¯h: the query sent to server Sh by U¯ during the oblivious transfer stage;
– A¯h: the answer sent to U by S¯h or sent to U¯ by Sh during the oblivious transfer stage;
– C¯h: the transcript of communication between (S¯h,U) or (Sh, U¯) during the oblivious transfer stage, i.e., C¯h = (Q¯h, A¯h).
Let U j be a random variable for every j ∈ N. For any J ⊆ N, we denote by U J = (U j: j ∈ J ) the sequence of random
variables U j indexed by j ∈ J . Let H(U) = −∑u Pr[U = u] logPr[U = u] be the binary entropy of U. Let U′ be a random
variable. We denote by Pr[U= u | u′] the conditional probability that U= u given that U′ = u′ .
Assumptions: As in [34,8], our formal deﬁnitions and security proofs are based on the following assumptions (1)–(8):
– The random input of U is truly random and independent of the inputs of D, i.e., it holds that:
H(Y |W,X) = H(Y); (1)
– The random input of D is truly random and independent of the inputs of U , i.e., it holds that:
H(X | I,Y) = H(X); (2)
– The private input of U is independent of any other data in the setup stage, i.e., it holds that:
H(I) = H(I |W,X,D[],Y); (3)
– Every index i ∈ [n] will be the choice of U with positive probability, i.e., it holds that:
Pr[I= i] > 0 for every i ∈ [n]; (4)
– The secrets are all totally independent of each other, i.e., for every K , K ′ ⊆ [n] such that K ∩ K ′ = ∅:
H(WK ′ |WK ) = H(WK ′)3; (5)
– For every K ⊆ [], the messages sent to SK = {Sh: h ∈ K } are determined by the inputs of D:
H(DK |W,X) = 0; (6)
– For every K ⊆ [], the queries sent to SK are determined by the inputs of U :
H(QK | I,Y) = 0; (7)
3 The sender’s n secrets are assumed to be implication-free in Section 4.1 of [8], i.e., H(Wi | W j) > 0 whenever i = j. However, it is pointed out in
Section 4.1 of [8] that the secrets are usually independent.
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H(AK | QK ,DK ) = 0.4 (8)
Correctness: The protocol P is said to be correct if for every i ∈ [n] and K ⊆ [] such that |K | = k,
H(Wi | I= i,Y,CK ) = 0. (9)
Privacy: The protocol P is said to be (t, τ )-private if the following requirements are satisﬁed:
– Receiver’s privacy: For every T ⊆ [] such that |T | t and corrupted servers S¯T ,
H(I | DT ,QT ) = H(I); (10)
– Sender’s privacy I: For every T ⊆ [] such that |T | τ and corrupted receiver U¯ ,
H(W | I,Y,DT ) = H(W); (11)
– Sender’s privacy II: For every K , T ⊆ [] such that |K | = k, |T | τ , index i, random input Y and U¯ ,
H(W | I= i,Y= Y , C¯K ,DT ,Wi) = H(W |Wi).5 (12)
2.3. Related information equalities
In this section, we shall prove several information equalities on the random variables deﬁned in Section 2.2. These
equalities capture the essence of our deﬁnition of privacy and simplify the security proofs.
The ﬁrst equality (see Lemma 1) shows that a set of corrupted servers can learn information on what the receiver is
interested in only from the queries they may obtain from the receiver. Intuitively, this is true because the messages the
corrupted servers may obtain are from either the sender or the receiver. However, the messages from the sender convey no
information on what the receiver is interested in.
Lemma 1. In a one-round (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol, for every T ⊆ [], it holds that
H(I | DT ,QT ) = H(I | QT ). (13)
Proof. Since H(I | QT )− H(I | DT ,QT ) = H(DT | QT )− H(DT | QT , I), it is equivalent to show that H(DT | QT ) = H(DT | QT , I).
Due to (7), we have H(QT | I,Y) = 0 and therefore H(DT ) H(DT | QT ) H(DT | QT , I) H(DT | Y, I). Hence, it suﬃces to
show that H(DT ) = H(DT | Y, I). Due to (3), we have that H(DT | Y) − H(DT | Y, I) = H(I | Y) − H(I | Y,DT ) = 0 and therefore
H(DT | Y, I) = H(DT | Y). Hence, we turn to show that H(DT ) = H(DT | Y). Due to (6) and (1), we have that H(Y)  H(Y |
DT ) H(Y |W,X) = H(Y), which implies H(DT ) − H(DT | Y) = H(Y) − H(Y | DT ) = 0 and completes the proof. 
The second equality (see Lemma 2) shows that before the oblivious transfer stage any coalition of the receiver and a set
of corrupted servers can learn information on the secrets of the sender only from what the corrupted servers may obtain
from the sender during the setup stage. Intuitively, this is true because the input and random input of the receiver convey
no information on the sender’s secrets.
Lemma 2. In a one-round (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol, for every T ⊆ [], it holds that
H(W | I,Y,DT ) = H(W | DT ). (14)
Proof. Due to (3), we have H(W | Y,DT ) − H(W | I,Y,DT ) = H(I | Y,DT ) − H(I | W,Y,DT ) = 0. Therefore, H(W | I,Y,DT ) =
H(W | Y,DT ). It suﬃces to show H(W | Y,DT ) = H(W | DT ). Since H(W | DT )− H(W | Y,DT ) = H(Y | DT )− H(Y | DT ,W), we
4 Following Section 2.2 of [8], we suppose that for every h ∈ [] the message Dh contains the random bits needed by Sh in an execution of the protocol
and, without loss of generality, the server Sh is deterministic.
5 We are analyzing unconditionally secure protocols. Therefore, following Section 2.2 of [8], we can suppose that the corrupted receiver is deterministic.
For simplicity, we suppose that i is the ﬁxed input actually contributed by U¯ and Y is the ﬁxed random input used by U¯ , respectively. In case i is not in
{1,2, . . . ,n}, Eq. (12) should be interpreted as H(W | I= i,Y= Y , C¯K ,DT ) = H(W), i.e., the receiver U¯ learns nothing.
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W,X) = H(Y), which implies the desired equality. 
The last equality (see Lemma 3) shows that given the transcript of the communication between the receiver and the
servers labeled by a k-subset K ⊆ [], any coalition of the receiver and a set of corrupted servers labeled by T ⊆ [] can
learn more information on the sender’s secrets only from the messages that ST may obtain from the sender and the
answers that the receiver may obtain from the servers SK\T . Intuitively, this is true because the servers are assumed to be
deterministic and the answers of the servers SK∩T could have been computed by themselves using the messages from both
the sender and the receiver.
Lemma 3. In a one-round (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol, for every i ∈ [n], Y and K , T ⊆ [] such that |K | = k, it holds that
H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,CK ,DT ,Wi) = H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,DT ),
H(Wi | I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,DT ) = 0. (15)
Proof. Due to (9) and (8), we have that H(W | I = i,Y = Y ,CK ,DT ,Wi) = H(W | I = i,Y = Y ,CK ,DT ) and H(AK∩T |
QK∩T ,DK∩T ) = 0. It follows that H(W | I = i,Y = Y ,CK ,DT ) = H(W | I = i,Y = Y ,QK\T ,QK∩T ,AK\T ,AK∩T ,DT \K ,DK∩T ) =
H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,QK ,AK\T ,DT ). Due to (7), we have that H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,QK ,AK\T ,DT ) = H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,DT ),
which implies the ﬁrst equality of (15). Similarly, the second equality of (15) holds. 
3. Reducing (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based PIR
In this section, we ﬁrst develop a framework for polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic PIR and then
present a speciﬁc reduction from (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic PIR in the presence
of semi-honest receivers.
3.1. PIR based on polynomial interpolation
Let S1, . . . ,Sk be k servers, each of which has a copy of the database W = W1, . . . ,Wn . Let U be a user who has an
index i ∈ [n] and wants to retrieve Wi from the servers without revealing i. A t-private k-server polynomial interpolation-
based private information retrieval protocol (see Protocol 1) is an (n + 1)-tuple P = (E; P1, . . . , Pn), where E : [n] → Fmq
is an encoding of the indices and each function P j : Fmq → {0,1} is an m-variate polynomial of degree at most d =  k−1t 
such that P j(E(a)) = δ j,a for all j,a ∈ [n], where Fq is the ﬁnite ﬁeld of order q > k and δ j,a is equal to 1 if j = a and 0
otherwise. Each server Sh encodes W as an m-variate polynomial P (Z1, . . . , Zm) =∑nj=1 W j · P j(Z1, . . . , Zm) of degree at
most d and is associated with a ﬁeld element λh , where λ1, . . . , λk ∈ Fq \ {0} are distinct. To retrieve Wi , the user U picks
t random vectors V1, . . . , Vt ∈ Fmq and sends to each server Sh a query Qh = E(i) + λhV1 + · · · + (λh)t Vt . The server Sh
replies with Ah = P (Qh). At last, U interpolates the univariate polynomial G(λ) = P (E(i) + λV1 + · · · + λt Vt) of degree at
most k − 1 and outputs G(0) = P (E(i)) = Wi . The polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols of [5,38] are summarized
in Appendix A.
Protocol 1. Polynomial interpolation-based PIR
Input of Sh: the database W = W1, . . . ,Wn ∈ Fnq .
Input of U : the index i ∈ [n].
U : choose V1, . . . , Vt ∈ Fmq uniformly and send Qh = E(i) + λhV1 + · · · + (λh)t Vt to Sh for every h ∈ [k];
Sh: send P (Qh) to U , where P (Z1, . . . , Zm) =∑nj=1 W j · P j(Z1, . . . , Zm);
U : interpolate G(λ) = P (E(i) + λV1 + · · · + λt Vt) and output G(0).
3.2. Reduction in the presence of semi-honest receivers
Let P = (E; P1, . . . , Pn) be a t-private (k − τ )-server polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocol. Protocol 2, described
below, converts P to a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-(n1) protocol. During the setup stage, the sender D shares the secrets using
Shamir’s τ -private threshold sharing scheme (TSSS) with every k-subset of the  servers. During the oblivious transfer stage,
the receiver U invokes P with k out of the  servers.
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(n
1
)
based on polynomial interpolation-based PIR
Input of D: n secrets W = W1, . . . ,Wn ∈ Fnq .
Input of U : an index i ∈ [n].
Setup stage
D: choose polynomials B0(λ) =∑k−1a=0 B0,aλa ∈ Fq[λ] and B j(λ) =∑τa=0 B j,aλa ∈ Fq[λ] uniformly such that B0(0) +
B j(0) = W j for every j ∈ [n];
D: deﬁne F (λ, Z1, . . . , Zm) = B0(λ) +∑nj=1 B j(λ) · P j(Z1, . . . , Zm);
D: for any k-subset K ⊆ [], choose (XK ,h: h ∈ K ) ∈ Fkq uniformly such that
∑
h∈K XK ,h = 0;
D: send {{XK ,h: h ∈ K ⊆ [] and |K | = k}, F (λh, Z1, . . . , Zm)} to Sh for every h ∈ [].
Oblivious transfer stage
U : choose k servers, say SK = {Sh: h ∈ K }, where K ⊆ [] and |K | = k;
U : choose V1, . . . , Vt ∈ Fmq uniformly and send K , Qh = E(i) +
∑t
a=1(λh)aVa to Sh for every h ∈ K ;
Sh: send Ah = F (λh, Qh)∏ j∈K\{h} −λ jλh−λ j + XK ,h to U , where h ∈ K ;
U : output ∑h∈K Ah .
Lemma 4. Protocol 2 satisﬁes the correctness requirement.
Proof. The univariate polynomial G(λ) = F (λ, E(i) + λV1 + · · · + λt Vt) is of degree at most max{k − 1, τ + dt} k − 1. Due
to Lagrange polynomial interpolation, we have that∑
h∈K
Ah =
∑
h∈K
[
F
(
λh, E(i) + λhV1 + · · · + (λh)t Vt
) ∏
j∈K\{h}
−λ j
λh − λ j
]
= G(0) = Wi .
Hence, the receiver is able to determine the value of Wi by interacting with k servers. 
Referring to Protocol 2, let K be the collection of all k-subsets of []. For every K ∈ K and h ∈ K , we denote by XK ,h
the random variable representing XK ,h . For every h ∈ [] and j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}, we denote by B j(λh) the random variable
representing B j(λh). Let
Xk,h = (XK ,h: h ∈ K ∈K), XB,h =
(
B0(λh), . . . ,Bn(λh)
)
, Fh = B0(λh) +
n∑
j=1
B j(λh)P j(Z1, . . . , Zm). (16)
Then the random variable representing the messages sent to Sh by D is
Dh = (Xk,h,Fh). (17)
For every h ∈ [], let Qh be the random variable representing the query Qh sent to Sh by U . Then we have that
Ah =
∏
j∈K\{h}
−λ j
λh − λ j
[
B0(λh) +
n∑
j=1
B j(λh)P j(Qh)
]
+ XK ,h (18)
is the random variable representing the answer of Sh on receiver’s query Qh and sender’s message Dh . For every h ∈ [], we
deﬁne
D∗h = (Xk,h,XB,h). (19)
Let T be the collection of all τ -subsets of []. Following the notations in Section 2.2, for any T ∈ T , the deﬁnitions of the
random variables Xk,T , XB,T , FT , DT , AT and D∗T are straightforward. It is not hard to see that DT is a function of D∗T and
therefore H(DT | D∗T ) = 0.
Let B = (B0,0, . . . ,Bn,τ ) be a random vector describing the coeﬃcient vector B = (B0,0, . . . , Bn,τ ) of the random polyno-
mials B0(λ), . . . , Bn(λ). For a speciﬁc τ -subset T = {1,2, . . . , τ } ∈ T , we deﬁne
Λ′ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 λ1 · · · λk−11
1 λ2 · · · λk−12
...
...
...
...
1 λτ · · · λk−1τ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , Λ′′ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 λ1 · · · λτ1
1 λ2 · · · λτ2
...
...
...
...
1 λτ · · · λττ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
and Λ = diag(Λ′,Λ′′, . . . ,Λ′′), where Λ′′ occurs exactly n times.
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Proof. Let ST = {Sh: h ∈ T } be any coalition of t servers, where T is a t-subset of []. We show that the receiver’s index is
protected, that is a coalition of t servers do not learn any information about the index. We need to show that H(I | DT ,QT ) =
H(I). Due to Lemma 1, it suﬃces to show that H(I | QT ) = H(I). For every i ∈ [n] and Q T = (Qh: h ∈ T ) ∈ (Fmq )t , we have
that Pr[QT = Q T | I = i] = 1/qmt due to the privacy of Shamir’s t-private TSSS. It follows that I and QT are independent.
Hence, H(I | QT ) = H(I). 
The following lemma shows any coalition of τ servers and the user has no information about the secrets after the setup
stage.
Lemma 6. Protocol 2 satisﬁes the sender’s privacy I requirement.
Proof. Let ST be a set of servers colluding with U , where T ∈ T is arbitrary. For simplicity, we suppose that T =
{1,2, . . . , τ }. Due to Lemma 2, it suﬃces to show H(W | DT ) = H(W). It is obvious that
H
(
W
∣∣ D∗T )= H(W ∣∣ DT ,D∗T ) H(W | DT ) H(W).
On the other hand, we have that H(W | XB,T ) − H(W | D∗T ) = H(Xk,T | XB,T ) − H(Xk,T | XB,T ,W) = 0 in Protocol 2. Hence,
H(W | XB,T ) = H(W | D∗T ). We turn to show that H(W | XB,T ) = H(W).
Let W ∈ Fnq and XB,T = (B0(λ1), . . . , Bn(λτ )) ∈ F(n+1)τq be arbitrary. For every j ∈ [n], let ρ j = (1,0, . . . ,0,1,0, . . . ,0) ∈
F
k+n(τ+1)
q be a vector with nonzero entries ρ
j
1 = 1 and ρ jk+( j−1)τ+1 = 1. We calculate the number of coeﬃcient vectors B
of the random polynomials B0(λ), . . . , Bn(λ), which are chosen randomly by D in Protocol 2 and satisfy the following two
linear equation systems
(I) Λ · B =
⎡
⎣ B0(λ1)...
Bn(λτ )
⎤
⎦ and (II) ρ · B =
⎡
⎣ρ
1
...
ρn
⎤
⎦ · B =
⎡
⎣W1...
Wn
⎤
⎦ (20)
simultaneously. Clearly, the linear equations given by (I) and (II) ensure that XB,T = XB,T and W = W , respectively. It is
clear that the matrix
[Λ
ρ
]
is of full rank (n+ 1)τ + n and therefore (20) has exactly qk−τ solutions. On the other hand, ρ is
of full rank n and (II) have exactly qk+nτ solutions. It follows that
Pr[XB,T = XB,T |W= W ] = the number of solutions of (20)
the number of solutions of (II)
= 1
q(n+1)τ
,
i.e., XB,T | W is uniformly distributed in its domain F(n+1)τq , which implies that W and XB,T are independent. Hence,
H(W | XB,T ) = H(W). 
Finally, we prove privacy after the oblivious transfer stage.
Lemma 7. Protocol 2 satisﬁes the sender’s privacy II requirement.
Proof. Let i ∈ [n], K ∈K and T ∈ T be arbitrary. For simplicity, we suppose T = {1,2, . . . , τ }. Let Y = (Va: a ∈ [t]) ∈ (Fmq )t
be the random vectors chosen by U . Due to Lemma 3, it suﬃces to show that
H(W | I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,DT ) = H(W |Wi).
Let Γ = [n] \ {i}. We have that H(W | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,DT ) = H(WΓ | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,DT ) due to Eq. (15) and H(W |
Wi) = H(WΓ ) due to Eq. (5). Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that
H(WΓ | I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,DT ) = H(WΓ ).
Since H(DT | D∗T ) = 0, we have that H(WΓ ) H(WΓ | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,DT )  H(WΓ | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,D∗T ). Hence, it is
enough to show that
H
(
WΓ
∣∣ I= i,Y= Y ,AK\T ,D∗T )= H(WΓ ).
Let WΓ ∈ Fn−1q and (AK\T , D∗T ) be such that Pr[WΓ = WΓ ] > 0 and Pr[AK\T = AK\T ,D∗T = D∗T | WΓ = WΓ , I = i,Y =
Y ] > 0. We want to compute the conditional probability of (AK\T , D∗T ) when D’s secrets indexed by Γ are WΓ and U ’s
index and random input are i and Y , respectively. In other words, we want to compute
p1 = Pr
[
AK\T = AK\T ,D∗ = D∗
∣∣WΓ = WΓ , I= i,Y= Y ]. (21)T T
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pendent of WΓ for ﬁxed i and Y in Protocol 2. For every h ∈ T and K ∈K such that h ∈ K , the server Sh receives a random
ﬁeld element XK ,h . It follows that Sh receives exactly
(
−1
k−1
)
random ﬁeld elements in an execution of Protocol 2, i.e., the
message Xk,h received by Sh contains exactly
(
−1
k−1
)
random ﬁeld elements. Therefore, the messages Xk,T received by servers
ST contain exactly τ
(
−1
k−1
)
random ﬁeld elements. Hence, we have that
Pr[Xk,T = Xk,T | WΓ , i, Y ] = 1
qτ(
−1
k−1)
. (22)
Due to Eq. (15), we have that H(Wi | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,D∗T )  H(Wi | I = i,Y = Y ,AK\T ,DT ) = 0. Therefore, the data
(AK\T , D∗T ) uniquely determines a secret Wi ∈ Fq for ﬁxed i and Y . Due to Eq. (5) and the choice of Xk,T in Protocol 2, we
have that Wi is independent of (Xk,T ,WΓ ) for ﬁxed i and Y . Hence,
Pr[Wi = Wi | Xk,T ,WΓ , i, Y ] = Pr[Wi = Wi]. (23)
The choice of XB,T in Protocol 2 should be consistent with the value of W and independent of any other data. Therefore, as
in the proof of Lemma 6, we have that
Pr[XB,T = XB,T | Wi, Xk,T ,WΓ , i, Y ] = Pr[XB,T = XB,T | Wi,WΓ ] = 1
q(n+1)τ
. (24)
Due to Eqs. (7), (16) and (18), the tuple (XB,T ,Wi, Xk,T ,WΓ , i, Y ) uniquely determines AT . Clearly, any valid answers
AK\T replied by servers SK\T should satisfy
∑
h∈K\T Ah +
∑
h∈T Ah = Wi . Therefore, the domain of AK\T is equal to AK\T =
{(a1, . . . ,a|K\T |): ∑|K\T |h=1 ah = Wi −∑h∈T Ah}. Furthermore, it is clear that AK\T is uniformly distributed on AK\T (see step 3
in the oblivious transfer stage of Protocol 2). Hence,
Pr[AK\T = AK\T | XB,T ,Wi, Xk,T ,WΓ , i, Y ] = 1|AK\T | =
1
q|K\T |−1
. (25)
Due to Eq. (21), p1 is equal to the product of the left-hand sides of Eqs. (22), (23), (24) and (25). Hence, we have that
p1 = 1
qτ(
−1
k−1)
· Pr[Wi = Wi] · 1
q(n+1)τ
· 1
q|K\T |−1
,
which implies that (AK\T ,D∗T ) and WΓ are independent as long as i and Y are ﬁxed. It follows that H(WΓ | I = i,Y = Y ,
AK\T ,D∗T ) = H(WΓ ). 
Communication complexity. The receiver sends to each server Sh a vector Qh ∈ Fmq and a subset K ∈ K as its query
and receives an answer Ah ∈ Fq in return. Therefore, the communication complexity between the receiver and servers
is γ (n) = k(m + 1) logq + log (k). The polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols enumerated in Appendix A require
m = O (n1/ k−τ−1t ). Hence, we have that:
Theorem 1. Let t, τ , k,  be positive integers such that   k  t + τ + 1. Protocol 2 is a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-(n1) protocol of
communication complexity O (n1/ k−τ−1t ) between a semi-honest receiver and servers.
4. Reducing (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
to any PIR
In this section, we build communication-eﬃcient DOT from any PIR. The privacy of any 1-private PIR protocols can
be boosted without increasing the asymptotic communication complexity due to the transformation of [3]. On the other
hand, [21] provides a method of converting any PIR to SPIR without increasing the asymptotic communication complexity.
Eventually, the reduction from DOT to SPIR (see Protocol 3) enables us to build DOT from any PIR.
Replication-based threshold secret sharing scheme. A τ -private k-participant replication-based threshold secret sharing scheme
CNFτ ,k (based on [27]) involves a dealer D who has a secret g ∈ G and k participants S1, . . . ,Sk , where G is an abelian
group. The scheme proceeds as follows: (I) The dealer D chooses (kτ) random group elements, each of which is indexed by
a τ -subset of [k], say {gT : T ⊆ [k], |T | = τ }, such that ∑T gT = g; (II) The dealer D sends {gT : h /∈ T } to Sh for every
h ∈ [k]. The τ -privacy of CNFτ ,k follows from the fact that any τ participants ST do not know the share gT .
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(n
1
)
to SPIR. Let t , τ , k,  be positive integers such that t+τ < k . We reduce (t, τ )-private (k, )-
DOT-
(n
1
)
to any t-private (k − τ )-server SPIR by the following Protocol 3. During the setup stage, the sender D distributes
the secrets W among each k-subset of servers SK using CNFτ ,k . During the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver U interacts
with k out of the  servers. Speciﬁcally, U invokes an instance of the SPIR with each subset of k − τ servers SK\T , where
T ⊆ K and |T | = τ . The receiver U receives k − τ answers from SK\T which reveal [WK ,T ]i , the i-th data item of WK ,T .
Protocol 3. (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
based on SPIR
Input of D: n secrets W = W1, . . . ,Wn ∈ Fnq .
Input of U : an index i ∈ [n].
Procedure: P = (Q,A,R), a t-private (k − τ )-server SPIR protocol.
Setup stage
D: for every K ∈K, T ∈ T such that T ⊆ K , choose WK ,T ∈ Fnq uniformly such that
∑
T WK ,T = W ;
D: send Dh = {WK ,T : K ∈K, T ∈ T , T ⊆ K , h ∈ K \ T } to each server Sh;
D: generate a random string X = {XK ,T : K ∈K, T ∈ T , T ⊆ K } and send X to each Sh .
Oblivious transfer stage
U : choose a K ∈K and a random input YK = {YK ,T : T ∈ T , T ⊆ K };
U : for every T ∈ T , T ⊆ K and h ∈ K \ T , send Q K ,T ,h =Q(n, i, YK ,T )h to Sh;
Sh: send AK ,T ,h =A(n,WK ,T , Q K ,T ,h, XK ,T ) to U for every T ∈ T such that T ⊆ K , h ∈ K \ T ;
U : for every T ∈ T , T ⊆ K , compute ΦK ,T =R(i, YK ,T , {Q K ,T ,h, AK ,T ,h: h ∈ K \ T });
U : output ∑T : T∈T ,T⊆K ΦK ,T .
Let K ∈ K, T ∈ T be such that T ⊆ K . For every h ∈ K \ T , we denote by QK ,T ,h the random variable representing the
query sent to Sh by U when the P instance between U and SK\T is invoked. For any T ′ ⊆ [], we denote by QK ,,T ′ =
(QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ): T ∈ T , T ⊆ K ) = (QK ,T ,h: T ∈ T , T ⊆ K , h ∈ T ′ ∩ (K \ T )) the queries received by ST ′ during the oblivious
transfer stage. For every h ∈ K , let DK ,,h = (WK ,T : T ∈ T , T ⊆ K , h ∈ K \ T ) be the messages received by Sh in the CNFτ ,k
instances between D and SK . For every T ′ ⊆ [], let DK ,,T ′ = (DK ,,h: h ∈ T ′ ∩ K ) and DT ′ = (DK ,,T ′ : K ∈K).
Lemma 8. Protocol 3 satisﬁes the correctness requirement.
Proof. Due to the correctness of P , for every T ∈ T such that T ⊆ K , it holds that ΦK ,T = [WK ,T ]i and therefore∑
T : T∈T , T⊆K
ΦK ,T =
∑
T : T∈T , T⊆K
[WK ,T ]i =
[ ∑
T : T∈T , T⊆K
WK ,T
]
i
= Wi . 
Lemma 9. Protocol 3 satisﬁes the receiver’s privacy requirement.
Proof. Let SK be the set of servers interacted by U and T ∈ T be a subset of K . Due to the user privacy of P , for every
t-subset T ′ ⊆ [], it holds that H(I | QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T )) = H(I). Let ST ′ ⊆ SK be any coalition of t servers. Due to Lemma 1, it
suﬃces to show that H(I | QK ,,T ′) = H(I).
Let i ∈ [n] and Q K ,,T ′ = (Q K ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ): T ∈ T , T ⊆ K ) be arbitrary. Since the instances of P are totally independent of
each other, it holds that
Pr[QK ,,T ′ = Q K ,,T ′ | I= i] =
∏
T : T∈T , T⊆K
Pr[QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) = Q K ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) | I= i].
However, we have that Pr[QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) = Q K ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) | I = j] = Pr[QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) = Q K ,T ,T ′∩(K\T ) | I = i] for every j ∈ [n]
since H(I | QK ,T ,T ′∩(K\T )) = H(I). It follows that Pr[QK ,,T ′ = Q K ,,T ′ | I = i] = Pr[QK ,,T ′ = Q K ,,T ′ | I = j], i.e., QK ,,T ′ and I
are independent. Hence, we have that H(I | QK ,,T ′) = H(I). 
Lemma 10. Protocol 3 satisﬁes the sender’s privacy I requirement.
Proof. Let ST ′ be τ servers colluding with U , where T ′ ∈ T . Due to Lemma 2, it suﬃces to show that H(W | DT ′) = H(W).
The sender D invokes (k) instances of CNFτ ,k which are totally independent of each other. Let K ∈K be arbitrary. If T ′ ⊆ K ,
then the servers in ST ′ do not learn WK ,T ′ . Hence, H(W | DK ,,T ′) = H(W). If T ′ \ K = ∅, then Sh learns no information on
{WK ,T : T ∈ T , T ⊆ K } if h ∈ T ′ \ K or no information on {WK ,T : T ∈ T , K ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ⊆ K } if h ∈ K ∩ T ′ . Hence, we have that
H(W | DK ,,T ′) = H(W).
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are totally independent of each other, we have that Pr[DT ′ = DT ′ | W = W ] = ∏K∈K Pr[DK ,,T ′ = DK ,,T ′ | W = W ]. For
every W ′ ∈ Fnq , we have that Pr[DK ,,T ′ = DK ,,T ′ | W = W ] = Pr[DK ,,T ′ = DK ,,T ′ | W = W ′] since H(W | DK ,,T ′) = H(W).
It follows that Pr[DT ′ = DT ′ | W = W ] = Pr[DT ′ = DT ′ | W = W ′], i.e., DT ′ and W are independent. Hence, H(W | DT ′) =
H(W). 
Lemma 11. Protocol 3 satisﬁes the sender’s privacy II requirement.
Proof. Let SK and ST ′ be the servers interacted by U and colluding with U respectively, where K ∈K and T ′ ∈ T . Let T ∗
be the set of all τ -subsets of K , T ∗1 = {T ∈ T ∗: (T ′ ∩ K ) ⊆ T } and T ∗2 = {T ∈ T ∗: (T ′ ∩ K ) \ T = ∅}. That is, T ∗2 = T ∗ \ T ∗1 .
Furthermore, τ ′ = |T ′ ∩ K | τ and δ = |T ∗1 | =
(k−τ ′
τ−τ ′
)
. Let i ∈ [n], YK = (YK ,T : T ∈ T ∗) and Q K = (Q K ,T ,K\T : T ∈ T ∗) be the
ﬁxed index, random input and query of U , respectively. For every T ∈ T ∗ , an instance of P is invoked between U and SK\T
with WK ,T as the database. We denote
AK =
(
AK ,T ,K\T : T ∈ T ∗
); AK ,T ∗1 = (AK ,T ,K\T : T ∈ T ∗1 ); AK ,T ∗2 = (AK ,T ,K\T : T ∈ T ∗2 ).
Semi-honest case. For every T ∈ T ∗ , consider the instance P between a semi-honest U and SK\T . Due to the data privacy
of P , it holds that
H(WK ,T | I= i,YK ,T = YK ,T ,AK ,T ,K\T ) = H
(
WK ,T
∣∣ [WK ,T ]i). (26)
Therefore, for every WK ,T ,W ′K ,T ∈ Fnq such that [W ′K ,T ]i = [WK ,T ]i and AK ,T ∈ Fk−τq , it holds that
Pr[AK ,T = AK ,T | WK ,T , i, YK ,T ] = Pr
[
AK ,T = AK ,T
∣∣W ′K ,T , i, YK ,T ]. (27)
Due to (8) and (7), we have that H(AK ,T ∗2 | I= i,YK = YK ,DT ′) = 0. Due to (15), it suﬃces to show that
H(W | I= i,YK = YK ,AK ,T ∗1 ,DT ′) = H(W |Wi). (28)
Let AK ,T ∗1 and DT ′ be in the domains of AK ,T ∗1 and DT ′ , where DT ′ = (W K ,T : K ∈ K, T ∈ T ∗, T ′ ∩ (K \ T ) = ∅). The
secret Wi = b ∈ Fq is uniquely determined by AK ,T ∗1 and DT ′ since i, YK are ﬁxed. For every W ∈ Fnq such that Wi = b,
denote
pW = Pr[AK ,T ∗1 = AK ,T ∗1 ,DT ′ = DT ′ | W , i, YK ]. (29)
Let W ′ ∈ Fnq be such that W ′i = b. Due to the τ -privacy of CNFτ ,k , we have that
Pr[DT ′ = DT ′ | W , i, YK ] = Pr
[
DT ′ = DT ′
∣∣W ′, i, YK ]. (30)
For S = W or W ′ , we deﬁne ΩS = {w = (w1, . . . ,wδ) ∈ Fδ×nq :
∑δ
h=1 wh = S −
∑
T∈T ∗2 W

K ,T }. For every (b1, . . . ,bδ) ∈ Fδq
such that
∑δ
h=1 bh = b −
∑
T∈T ∗2 [W K ,T ]i and w ∈ ΩW and w ′ ∈ ΩW ′ such that wi = w ′i = (b1, . . . ,bδ), it is not hard to see
that
Pr[WK ,T ∗1 = w | DT ′ ,W , i, YK ] = Pr
[
WK ,T ∗1 = w ′
∣∣ DT ′ ,W ′, i, YK ]. (31)
On the other hand, due to (8), we have that
Pr[AK ,T ∗1 = AK ,T ∗1 |WK ,T ∗1 = w, DT ′ ,W , i, YK ] = Pr
[
AK ,T ∗1 = AK ,T ∗1
∣∣WK ,T ∗1 = w ′, DT ′ ,W ′, i, YK ]. (32)
Eqs. (27) and (28) imply that
Pr[AK ,T ∗1 = AK ,T ∗1 | DT ′ ,W , i, YK ] = Pr
[
AK ,T ∗1 = AK ,T ∗1
∣∣ DT ′ ,W ′, i, YK ]. (33)
It follows that pW = pW ′ due to Eqs. (26) and (29). Hence, (AK ,T ∗1 ,DT ′) and W are independent as long as i, YK and Wi
are ﬁxed, i.e., (28) holds and sender’s privacy II is satisﬁed if U is semi-honest.
Malicious case. Let SK and ST ′ be the servers interacted by U and colluding with U respectively, where K ∈K and T ′ ∈ T .
In order to learn as much information as possible, it is not hard to see that T ′ should be a subset of K , i.e., T ∈ T ∗ . Due to
the τ -privacy of the CNFτ ,k TSSS, the coalition of U¯ and server ST ′ is able to learn W as long as the share WK ,T ′ is known.
Consider the instance P between U¯ and SK\T ′ . If U¯ contributes no valid index, then the coalition learns no information on
WK ,T ′ and therefore it learns no information on W . If U¯ contributes an index j ∈ [n], then the coalition learns at most the
secret W j due to the data privacy of the instance P between U¯ and SK\T ′ and the privacy of CNFτ ,k . 
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(k
τ
)
instances of P with the interacted
servers. Let γ (n) be the communication complexity of P . Then the communication complexity between the receiver and
servers is
(k
τ
)
γ (n).
Theorem 2. If there is a t-private (k − τ )-server SPIR protocol of communication complexity γ (n), then for every integer  k, there
is a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication complexity O (γ (n)) between the receiver and servers.
Gertner et al. [21] proposed a general transformation from any one-round t-private k-server PIR protocol of communica-
tion complexity γ (n) to a one-round t-private (k + t)-server SPIR protocol of communication complexity O (γ (n)). Due to
this transformation and Theorem 2, we have
Theorem 3. If there is a t-private (k − t − τ )-server PIR protocol of communication complexity γ (n), then for every integer   k,
there is a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication complexity O (γ (n)) between the receiver and servers.
Applying Theorem 3 to the polynomial interpolation-based t-private k-server PIR of [5,38] gives:
Corollary 1. For any integers t, τ , k,  such that 1  t  k − 2, 0  τ  k − 1 − t and 3t+12 + τ  k  , there is a (t, τ )-private
(k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocol of communication complexity O (n1/
2(k−t−τ )−1
t ) between the receiver and servers.
Note that it is required that k  3t+12 + τ for obtaining sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and
servers in the above corollary.
The recent progress [39,18,28,12] in the research of LDCs yields the most eﬃcient 1-private PIR protocols to date. Specif-
ically, 1-private 3-server PIR protocols of communication complexity exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) have been obtained. Barkol
et al. [3] proposed a transformation from any 1-private k-server PIR of communication complexity γ (n) to t-private kt -
server PIR of communication complexity O (γ (n)). Due to these results and Theorem 3, we have
Corollary 2. For any positive integers t, τ ,  such that   3t + t + τ , there is a (t, τ )-private (3t + t + τ , )-DOT-(n1) protocol of
communication complexity exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) between the receiver and servers.
As an example, for t = τ = 1 and any  5, there is a (1,1)-private (5, )-DOT-(n1) protocol of communication complexity
exp(O (
√
logn log logn)) between the receiver and servers.
5. Evaluation of the reductions
In this section, we evaluate our reductions. Speciﬁcally, we compare them with known constructions of DOT and with
each other.
Privacy. The one-round (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols of [8] do not satisfy sender’s privacy II. In terms of our deﬁnition, their
(k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
protocols achieve (k−1)-receiver privacy, (k−1)-sender’s privacy I and 0-sender’s privacy II. For semi-honest
receivers, if we take t = k − 1 and τ = 0 in Protocol 2 and apply the encoding E of indices of [38] for m = n, then the
one-round (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
of [8] can be obtained. The (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
of [34] achieves t-receiver privacy, (k − 1 − t)-sender’s
privacy I and (k − 1 − t)-sender’s privacy II for any positive integer t < k − 1. Our speciﬁc reduction yields (k, )-DOT-(n1)
which achieves the same privacy whenever t + τ = k − 1. Hence, the speciﬁc reduction shows a tradeoff between receiver–
server communication complexity and privacy. The speciﬁc reduction is secure for semi-honest receivers. It is left open to
modify the speciﬁc reduction such that the sender’s privacy I and II can be achieved for malicious receivers. On the other
hand, our general reduction is fully secure.
Receiver–server communication complexity. Let t , τ be positive integers. It has been proved by [34] that k t + τ + 1 in any
(t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
. If t+τ +1 k 2t+τ , then the (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-(n1) obtained by the general reduction
require linear communication complexity between the receiver and servers due to Corollary 1. Hence, we prefer the speciﬁc
reduction. If k > 2t + τ , then  2(k−t−τ )−1t  >  k−τ−1t  and therefore the (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
(n
1
)
obtained by the general
reduction is more eﬃcient due to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Hence, we prefer the general reduction. Furthermore, for
small values of t and τ , the reduction given by Corollary 2 is much better than those given by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
since it is based on the 3-server PIR protocols of extremely small communication complexity exp(O (
√
logn log logn)).
Number of interacted servers. For availability, the receiver should interact with a small number of servers. The speciﬁc re-
duction of Theorem 1 achieves the lower bound given by [34] and therefore is optimal in terms of the number of interacted
servers. In contrast, the general reductions of Corollaries 1 and 2 require k 3t+12 +τ and k = 3t + t+τ , respectively. Hence,
they are not optimal in terms of the number of interacted servers.
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example, in the setup stage of our speciﬁc reduction, each server receives
(
−1
k−1
)
random masks (ﬁeld elements) and an
m-variate polynomial of small constant degree; in the setup stage of our general reduction from DOT to SPIR, each server
receives
(
−1
k−1
)(k−1
t
)
shares (vectors of n ﬁeld elements) of the database and
(

k
)(k
t
)
random masks (ﬁeld elements). However,
the setup complexity becomes reasonable if  = k and t is a constant less than k. We note that the DOT protocols in a
setting where  = k have been considered by Cheong et al. [13]. Our reductions are eﬃcient for that setting.
Independence of secrets. We assume that the sender’s secrets are totally independent in Section 2.2, i.e., Eq. (5) holds. How-
ever, our security proofs for the general reduction from DOT to SPIR in Section 4 do not depend on this assumption. On the
other hand, the assumption is necessary for our speciﬁc reduction.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study DOT of sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and servers. We present both
a speciﬁc reduction from DOT to polynomial interpolation-based PIR and a general reduction from DOT to any PIR. The
speciﬁc reduction yields DOT protocols which are optimal in terms of the number of interacted servers and are secure for
semi-honest receivers. The general reduction yields DOT protocols of extremely small communication complexity between
the receiver and servers and are secure for malicious receivers. The setup complexity of our reductions could be large for
some settings of the parameters. It is an open problem to reduce the setup complexity of our reductions.
Appendix A. Polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols
We enumerate four polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols in this appendix. Originally, the ﬁrst two do not fol-
low the framework depicted by Protocol 1. However, from our point of view, they fall into the framework of polynomial
interpolation-based PIR protocols.
A.1. Beimel–Ishai–Kushilevitz PIR Protocol I [5]
– Let Ω = {v ∈ {0,1}m | wt(v)  d} ⊆ Fmq , where wt(v) is the number of nonzero components of v . The encoding
E : [n] → Ω is a one-to-one mapping satisfying wt(E(i))wt(E( j)) for every i < j.
– Let S j = {a ∈ [m]: E( j)a = 1} for every j ∈ [n]. The polynomials P j are deﬁned inductively as follows
P j(Z1, . . . , Zm) =
∏
a∈S j
Za −
∑
i: S j⊂Si
P i(Z1, . . . , Zm).
A.2. Beimel–Ishai–Kushilevitz PIR Protocol II [5]
– Let Ω = {v = v1 ◦ · · · ◦ vd | ∀a ∈ [d], va ∈ {0,1}b and wt(va) = 1} ⊆ Fmq , where m = bd. For i ∈ [n],
E(i) = ei1+1 ◦ · · · ◦ eid+1 ∈ Ω,
where i has base-b expansion
∑
a∈[d] ia · ba−1 and eia+1 is the (ia + 1)st unit vector for every a ∈ [d].
– Identify (Z1, . . . , Zm) = (Z1,1, . . . , Z1,b; . . . ; Zd,1, . . . , Zd,b). For every j =∑a∈[d] ja · ba−1 ∈ [n],
P j(Z1,1, . . . , Z1,b; . . . ; Zd,1, . . . , Zd,b) = Z1, j1+1 . . . Zd, jd+1.
A.3. Beimel–Ishai–Kushilevitz PIR Protocol III [5]
– Let Ω = {ω0, . . . ,ωd}m ⊆ Fmq , where ω0, . . . ,ωd ∈ Fq \ {0} are distinct. The encoding E : [n] → Ω is one-to-one and for
every i ∈ [n],
E(i) = (wi1 , . . . ,wim ) ∈ Ω,
where
∑
a∈[m] ia  d. For any i < j and E( j) = (ω j1 , . . . ,ω jm ) ∈ Ω , it is required that
∑
a ia 
∑
a ja .
– The polynomials P j(Z1, . . . , Zm) are deﬁned inductively as follows
r j(Z1, . . . , Zm) =
m∏
a=1
ja−1∏
h=0
Za − wh
w ja − wh
,
P j(Z1, . . . , Zm) = r j(Z1, . . . , Zm) − δ j ·
j−1∑
i=1
r j
(
E(i)
)
Pi(Z1, . . . , Zm),
where δ j = 1 if ∑a ja = d and 0 otherwise.
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– Let Ω = {v ∈ {0,1}m | wt(v) = d} ⊆ Fmq . The encoding E : [n] → Ω is any one-to-one mapping.
– Let S j = {a ∈ [m]: E( j)a = 1} for every j ∈ [n]. The polynomials P j are deﬁned as follows
P j(Z1, . . . , Zm) =
∏
a∈S j
Za.
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